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Abstract 
 
 
This paper examines the degree to which political connections affect business 
rankings through a statistical analysis of Turkey’s industry rankings between 
2003-2011. The analysis demonstrates that business performance is associated 
with connectedness through industry and firm level data. We show that political 
connectedness varies according to a firm’s channel of access to obtain favouritism 
either through direct personal ties or institutional networks. Ideological 
motivations emerge to be significant in mobilising, shaping and tying firm 
behaviour to broader political agendas. In the conclusion we discuss the impact of 
deepening connectedness on long-term business fortunes and political institutions. 
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Political Connectedness and Business Performance: Evidence from Turkish 
Industry Rankings 
 
1. Introduction 
The spread and effects of political connections between firms and politicians are 
widely acknowledged in business and economics literature. Most quantitative 
studies set out to examine how politically connected firms’ (PCF) financial 
performance and preferential access to banking and government favours are 
positively affected by their links to political candidates and parties. These are 
measured in a variety of ways: higher stock returns,1 projected earnings and 
financial forecasts,2 access to finance,3 protection against competition,4 or the 
impact of a single political actor’s business links on firm performance and policy 
formulation.5  
 
However, along with its perceived advantages to the firm, business-politics 
relationships also incur societal and economic costs. Scholars broadly agree that 
political interference in the management of firms can also be harmful to the long-
term performance and bring opportunity costs. Such firms survive despite poor 
operational skills,6 have lower returns on assets,7 have a negative impact on 
employment and income distribution,8 and even when privatised PCFs under-
perform their non-connected counterparts.9 PCFs seem to be problematic with 
regard to political justice and allocative efficiency. Such studies see a strong link 
between political interference in business, corruption and clientelism.10 Relations 
between dominant business groups and the state shape the political regime type 
and institutions,11 the way in which client business networks and lobby groups 
benefit from and provide selective and pro-business agendas,12 and how the 
detrimental consequences of inefficient redistribution and clientelism lead to high 
inequality and low productivity.13  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Fisman 2001; Claessens et al. 2008.	  
2	  Goldman et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2010.	  
3	  Khwaja and Mian 2005; Dinc 2005.	  
4	  Johnson and Mitton 2003.	  
5	  Roberts 1990; Acemoglu et al. 2010.	  
6	  Bertrand et al. 2007; Boubakri et al. 2012.	  
7	  Claessens et al. 2008Abdel-Baki, 2012.	  
8	  Abdel-Baki, 2012.	  
9	  Fan et al. 2007; Boubakri et al. 2008.	  
10	  Kettering 1988.	  
11	  Nam 1995; Guriev and Rachinsky 2005; Adly, 2009; Choi and Thum 2009.	  
12	  Buğra 1995; Salas-Porras 2005.	  
13	  Robinson and Verdier 2003; Abdel-Baki, 2012.	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During major economic downturns and/or political changes governmental ties 
may become critical for business survival and growth.  Under such conditions the 
firm management grows dependent on the political class.14  The subject of this 
paper is a period of major transformations in Turkish economy and politics. Since 
Turkey shifted to liberal economic growth in the 1980s, the most radical 
developments took place under the moderate Islamist Justice and Development 
Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP) from 2002.  Securing almost 50 per cent 
of total votes cast in the 2011 general elections, the AKP gained the mandate to 
rule for a third term. In government, the party has followed a pro-business agenda 
with fundamental market transformations: state owned assets were re-allocated 
through privatisation, foreign direct investment (FDI) reached a record high, 
municipal and state procurement schemes were expanded, and infrastructure and 
housing projects generated lucrative contracts. Increasing private sector 
development produced impressive economic growth with annual GDP growth 
rates hovering around 5-6 per cent in the ten years since 2002.15  However, the 
country has also become one of the most leveraged economies among emerging 
markets with a net external debt of 413 billion USD, about 51 per cent of GDP.16 
 
In politics, the AKP worked to transform the secular state with legal purges, 
bureaucratic cadre building and institutional re-structuring.17 Growing political 
pressures unleashed unprecedented protests against the autocracy of Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (hereafter Erdoğan) in May-June 2013 across the 
country. Uniting around those groups who opposed the construction of a shopping 
mall in Istanbul’s Gezi Park, thousands marched in major cities to express their 
discontent with AKP rule. The government’s heavy-handed use of the police force 
led to several deaths and injured more than seven thousand protestors.   
 
Many political scientists have argued that the AKP aimed to restructure state 
institutions according to its ideology and followed partisan policies to nurture a 
new breed of capitalists in power.18 Scholars have substantiated their arguments 
with findings from local business operations19  and small and medium-sized 
enterprises.20 Others showed the degree to which the AKP government created its 
own pro-government press through financial and regulatory pressures on business 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Acemoglu et al. 2010. 
15 See: http://databank.worldbank.org/ (Accessed on 26 June 2013). 
16	  Harvey and Bilgic 2013.	  
17 Polat 2013. 
18 Atasoy 2009; Öniş 2011. 
19 Author; Bayırbağ 2011. 
20 Hoşgör 2011. 
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groups.21  However, the broader impact of AKP ties to business fortunes have not 
been addressed systematically. By studying data of the top 1,000 companies of the 
Istanbul Chamber of Industry (İstanbul Sanayi Odası- commonly known as ISO) 
between 2003-2011, business connections of leading AKP members and pro-
government business associations, we are able to examine the following 
questions: i) to what extent do connected firms show different performance 
indicators in their ranking mobility vis-à-vis their non-connected peers? ii) does 
the type of political connectedness through personal ties and institutional 
networks show performance variations among firms? iii) To what extent did the 
state of Turkish industry rankings change under AKP rule? 
 
The paper has three contributions. First, we show that the type of political 
connection matters in business performance through a historical analysis and their 
benefits tend to stem from either direct personal channels or institutional and 
network ties. Second, in most international business and economics literature on 
PCF, political party ideology is seen as dormant or insignificant. In contrast, we 
regard ideological motivations to be highly significant in mobilising, shaping and 
aligning firm behaviour. This allows us to see deepening linkages between 
business and politics in relation to the regime type and political institutions. Third, 
we provide an extensive treatment of connectedness with a robust sample of the 
top 1,000 firms rather than a small set of stock listed companies or global listings. 
Thus, our industry-level analysis demonstrates the extent to which business 
performance can be associated with connectedness through industry and firm level 
data.  Overall, we aim to deepen academic debate on firm performance in relation 
to political ties in the business and politics literature. The article demonstrates 
why scholars, policy makers and the wider public should be interested in the 
scope of political associations as it raises questions on a number of important 
issues: i) long-term business efficiency under political constraints; ii) opportunity 
and welfare costs of business favouritism and clientelism; iii) influence of 
deepening ties on political institutions and freedoms. 
 
Following a literature review on business-politics relations and connectedness, we 
develop a set of hypotheses. The methodology section explains how the data were 
utilised, connections were identified, and business rankings were calculated. The 
penultimate section provides a discussion of the key findings.  The conclusion 
expands on the significance of the results, discusses the impact of deepening 
connectedness on political institutions along with limitations and future 
directions. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Kuban and Sozeri 2012.	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2. Literature review: politically connected firms and business-politics 
relations  
Firms get preferential access to a number of value enhancing resources and 
opportunities through political connections.  Fisman’s (2001) analysis of 
Indonesia showed that a considerable percentage of well-connected firms' value 
came from their high level political connections and favours they obtained 
through them.  In her widely cited work, Faccio (2006) found corporate political 
connections to be relatively widespread: They exist in 35 of the 47 countries that 
she sampled. However, they appear to be less common in countries with more 
stringent regulation of political conflicts of interest and more widespread in 
countries that are perceived as being highly corrupt. Connections are also more 
widespread among larger firms. Faccio (2006) finds a significant increase in 
corporate value when those involved in business enter politics. The stock price 
impact of a new connection is larger whenever a businessperson is elected as 
prime minister, rather than as a member of parliament, and whenever a large 
shareholder, rather than an officer, enters politics. However, while these findings 
rest on a relatively large sample of PCF in the UK (154 firms), Japan (31 firms) 
and Thailand (23 firms), the study detected a rather small and sporadic number of 
PCF in several leading emerging economies where PCF are expected to be 
widespread. For example, there is only one company in her sample connected 
with a minister or MP in each of Turkey and the Philippines, and none in South 
Africa or Brazil. This shortcoming indicates broader problems of identifying PCF 
in cross-country analyses. Indeed, two other such studies, Boubakri et al. (2012) 
and Chen et al. (2010), formulate their initial sample of politically connected 
firms based on Faccio’s (2006) original data.   
 
Boubakri et al. (2012)22 update Faccio’s (2006) data with another 61 PCF from 
2002 and 2003 and investigate the impact of political connections on firm 
performance and risk-taking in publicly traded companies. Using a long-term 
event study covering a sample of 234 politically connected firms headquartered in 
12 developed and 11 developing countries over the period of 1989-2003, they find 
that firms increase their risk-taking practices and performance after the 
establishment of a political connection. The authors also document an increase in 
PCF’s financial leverage, their use of long-term debt, and their liquidity ratio 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 In the sample of Boubakri et al. (2012) there are 79 British companies (33.76% of their sample), 
followed by Japanese firms (27 firms, 11.54%), and Malaysian firms (22 firms, 9.40%). Out of the 
541 politically connected firms in her study, Faccio (2006) finds 154 connections in the UK 
(28.47%): 32 in Japan (5.91%); and 88 in Malaysia (16.27%). Furthermore, 146 connections 
involve members of parliament whereas the others involve close ties with government officials or 
heads of state. Politically connected firms are spread across industries, with 19.66% in the 
financial sector, 15.38% in consumer durables, and 10.68% in services.  
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during the first three years of the political connection vis-à-vis the three years 
before the connection.  
 
Through an analysis of stock price responses to the announcement of the board 
nomination of a politically connected director in S&P 500 companies between 
1996 and 2000, Goldman et al. (2009) find that PCF show positive abnormal 
stock returns.  This finding on the US is in line with other research such as 
Johnson and Mitton (2003) on Malaysia and Claessens et al. (2008) on Brazil.  
Johnson and Mitton’s study shows that PCF benefited from the capital controls 
imposed in Malaysia during the Asian financial crisis in 1998 and PCF associated 
with PM Mahathir Mohamad had significantly higher stock returns. By using 
indicators of political connections constructed from political campaign 
contribution data, Claessens et al. (2008) similarly show that Brazilian firms that 
provided contributions to elected federal deputies experienced higher stock 
returns than firms that did not around the 1998 and 2002 elections. However, the 
prediction of this benefit in earnings and stock return are also subject to volatility 
and political uncertainties.23 Boubakri et al. (2013) show PCF have more volatile 
earnings and show greater risk taking in countries where they are rescued in case 
of turbulence. 
 
Benefits of political ties to the firm do not only appear in the form of increased 
business opportunities, predicted earnings, and rise in fixed and collateralisable 
assets, another critical factor can be in the form of improved access to finance.  
Using a loan-level data set of more than 90,000 firms in Pakistan between 1996 
and 2002, Khwaja and Mian (2005) show that PCF borrow 45 per cent more and 
have 50 per cent higher default rates. They claim that such preferential treatment 
occurs exclusively in government banks and has an economic cost as it goes to 
often poorly performing firms.24 Similarly, in her study on Italy, Sapienza (2004) 
shows that state-owned banks serve as a mechanism to supply political patronage. 
In a cross-country examination, Faccio et al. (2006) illustrate that PCFs are more 
likely to be bailed out than are their non-connected peers and they exhibit poorer 
operating performance than others at the time of the bailout and over the 
following two years.25  
 
However, there is some controversy over assessing the performance of PCF and 
the value of political connections.  A close relationship between a country’s 
political leadership and a segment of the business community can be an asset as it 
frequently provides privileged access to resources, finance and government 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  see Chen et al. 2010. 
24 Khwaja and Mian 2005. 
25 The study identified only one firm in Turkey. The most common cases occur in Malaysia. 
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procurement, and regulatory policies. However, there are also inefficiencies and 
risks born out of this close association with political interference and nepotism 
that affects firm management, trade relations and employment choices. Thus, 
political ties bring about a long-term liability and market constraints.  Numerous 
findings suggest that individual ties to key political figures and connections matter 
more and have greater influence on firm value when power is concentrated in the 
hands of a few people or a small number of business groups, but much less when 
it is dispersed through various democratic structures that contain checks and 
balances. These studies suggest that changing circumstances of the key political 
figures (illnesses, death or removal from power) have great effect on firm 
performance and economic growth in non-democracies, but much less or no effect 
in democracies. Jones and Olken’s (2005) pioneering study shows how the 
random death of a leader has a significant effect on economic growth in 
autocracies.26 In China, as in other emerging economies, political ties help firms 
to secure access to key resources more easily. Firms seek to appoint business 
executives with such ties to enhance business performance.27  
 
In mature democracies, political connections are structured differently and 
arguably institutionally more complex but perhaps not less influential.28 In their 
study, Acemoglu et al. (2010) argue that the effects of political connections 
between mature markets and middle income emerging economies may not be as 
wide as is commonly assumed. Examining the appointment effect of US Treasury 
Secretary Timothy Geithner, they find a cumulative abnormal return to Geithner 
connected firms of around 15 per cent, from day 0 (when the announcement was 
first leaked) to day 10. Abnormal returns enjoyed by Geithner-connected firms 
following his nomination must reflect some reason for the markets to believe that 
having Geithner at the Treasury would benefit those firms. Their result is close to 
previous findings in emerging markets and much higher than other studies have 
found for the United States or other relatively rich democracies.  However, the 
authors admit that they have no evidence that Geithner actually implemented the 
kind of favouritism implied by the initial stock market reaction. They suggest that 
the increase in the perceived value may lower the cost of capital and allow some 
firms to stay in business when others close.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  See also Fisman 2001 on Indonesia, Johnson and Mitton 2003 on Malaysia. 
27 Li and Tang 2013. 
28  For example, see Johnson and Kwak’s (2010) arguments that "the Wall Street banks are the 
new American oligarchy," operating "by the soft power of access and ideology" rather than bribery 
or blackmail. Some argue about the global implications of this, such as Bhagwati (1998) who 
points out that Wall Street firms pushed Washington to lobby for capital market liberalisation 
around the world. 
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Only a small number of studies illuminate the economic costs of PCF. Boubakri et 
al. (2012) suggest that political interference in the management of the firms and 
the weak managerial skills of politicians could be harmful to the firm’s 
performance. Bertrand et al. (2007) find that the profits of French firms managed 
by politically connected CEOs tend to decline as the fraction of their employment 
located in politically contested areas increases. Fan et al. (2007) on China and 
Boubakri et al. (2008) through an international sample find that newly privatised 
politically connected firms under-perform their non-connected counterparts. In an 
interesting study on Brazil, Claessens et al. (2008) show that PCF that make more 
campaign contributions have significantly lower returns on assets despite having 
higher investment rates.29  
 
Political economy approaches look at the problem through economic justice, 
regime type and allocative efficiency. Such studies tend to link political 
interference to business or businessmen’s career in politics in relation to 
corruption and clientelist ties. They examine how relations between dominant 
business groups and the state shape the political regime type and institutional 
trajectories;30 the way in which client business networks and lobby groups benefit 
from selective and pro-business agendas and in return shape the policy agenda;31 
and how detrimental consequences of inefficient redistribution and clientelism 
lead to high inequality and low productivity.32  
 
Clientalist ties are the most noteworthy element of PCF and they include a broad 
range of relationships.33 A narrow definition by Robinson and Verdier (2003) 
states that clientelism is a political exchange between a politician who gives 
patronage and a client who provides a vote or support.  Clientelism is utilised as a 
tool to create a loyal network of supporters in democracies as well as non-
democracies. Kettering (1988) defines political clientelism as a system constituted 
by patron-broker-client ties and networks. Robinson and Verdier (2003) argue that 
clientelism emerges in countries where productivity is low. However, it is 
prematurely assumed that modernisation and development eliminates clientelism. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 They estimate the economic costs of capital misallocation associated with PCF to be at least 0.2 
per cent of GDP per annum. This is measured in relation to: a welfare loss, which would arise if 
the rate of return on investment financed by this credit is lower than that on resources invested 
elsewhere.  
30 Nam 1995; Guriev and Rachinsky 2005; Choi and Thum 2009. 
31 Buğra 1995; Salas-Porras 2005; David et al. 2009. 
32 Robinson and Verdier 2003; Adly 2009; Abdel-Baki 2012. 
33There is an important difference between the concepts of clientelism and patronage. Patronage 
simply means the “exchange of public sector jobs for political support whereas clientelism 
includes not only jobs but also other state resources (goods, services, decisions, etc.)” (Hicken 
2011: 295).	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The first necessary condition is that the relation must be beneficial for both parties 
and there is a scale problem. A well-known example of clientelism is the 
relationship between large companies and the state in the era of General Park’s 
military regime between 1963 and 1979 in South Korea. Nam (1995) shows how 
most of the financial incentives were given to the largest companies in return for 
financial support to the military regime. The government controlled the allocation 
of credit and foreign currency, and the chaebol enjoyed preferential access to 
these and other resources. 
 
Thus, the nature of connectedness has important implications for political 
institutions. In many late industrialising economies governments historically 
developed clientelist ties with industrialists and supported the formation of 
business groups by protecting them through tariffs and trade restrictions.34 They 
also granted discretionary concessions (for example, in media, mining, and other 
licenced and regulated sectors), direct and indirect subsidies to certain favoured 
industries. In return for their loyalty, these business groups benefitted from state-
induced consolidation and foreign competition. There is some evidence to suggest 
that economic liberalisation benefited old business groups while creating new 
ones through privatisation.35 However, further cross-country analysis is needed to 
see how the shift from state-centred development to market liberalisation has 
altered business-politics relations and the nature of connectedness.  
 
State insiders, as managers of economic units and civil servants, shaped 
ownership structures of key industries in most post-communist economies through 
de-regulation and privatisation. Inter-elite conflicts have led to opaque allocation 
mechanisms. Authoritarian political regimes are progressively entrenched wherein 
ruling elites increase their ownership and/or political control of strategic assets.36 
In an analytical paper on Russia’s largest oligarchs, Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) 
illustrate how the concentration of ownership leads to a highly corrupt political 
regime in which neither oligarchs nor the bureaucracy are interested in 
implementing policies that will open the economy to broader participation. In 
China, Wank (2002) argues that clientelist networks evolved in line with market 
opening as the business fortunes of those connected to the Communist Party 
increased. Local officials implemented the economic reform policies first and 
foremost as a way to ensure their self-interests and provide further benefits to the 
political elite.37 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Buğra 1995. 
35 Khanna and Palepu 1999; Khanna and Yafeh 2007. 
36 Author, Zhang and Liu, 2010, Junisbai 2012. 
37 Zhang and Liu, 2010. 
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Based on this discussion we identify three methodological and theoretical 
insights:  
i) Institutional context: While firm based studies show the advantages of the 
firm’s connectedness to business fortunes, political economy analyses 
aggregate business-politics relations in broader frameworks of regime type 
and economic efficiency.38  We believe a more nuanced approach that 
takes into account the institutional context of connections can enhance our 
understanding of business-politics relations and bridge the gap between 
these two bodies of literature. The channels of access and ties between 
firms and political parties deserve further articulation. Recognising the fact 
that relationships between business and politicians are non-homogenous 
across political parties and over time, we differentiate between direct 
personal ties and institutionally structured networks of business interests to 
the ruling party. While these two channels may frequently overlap, they 
have distinct scales and functions. 
 
ii) Measurement issues: The evidence suggests that political connections are 
more covert and deeply embedded in informal institutions and business 
networks in emerging markets, which also tend to have deep information 
asymmetries.39 Studies mostly deal with large listed companies that are 
subject to corporate governance disclosures. For companies that are 
subject to lesser disclosure regulation the spread and depth of ties and 
influence in policy formulation remain under-researched in the business 
and economics literature.  In addition to these methodological problems, 
existing international comparisons are flawed as they fail to apply their 
criteria of connectedness evenly across countries.  Therefore, the studies of 
Faccio (2006), Boubakri et al. (2013) and others do not capture the depth 
and breadth of political connections, especially in emerging economies. 
We address this shortcoming through an industry and firm level analysis 
of the largest 1,000 establishments. Our analysis provides a replicable 
model for further studies. Our methodology extends the techniques used to 
refine the identification of connections and to overcome various 
measurement issues. 
iii) Implications for political institutions: How politics changes through 
deepening linkages between ruling parties and their business 
constituencies is another neglected area in business and management 
literature that deserves further investigation. Evidence from post-
communist states show that deepening ties between businesses and politics 
has weakened democratic formations. There is a need to examine how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Such as Faccio 2006; Hankla 2006; Choi and Thum 2009; Abdel-Baki 2012.	  
39	  Khwaja and Mian 2005; Chen et al. 2010.	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political institutions have been shaped by the evolving character of 
political patronage over business under economic liberalisation in young 
democracies such as Turkey.  This requires a bridge between PCF studies 
and political party lines: To what extent do connected firms remain loyal 
to their political party links? What determines this binding relationship in 
the long run? The character of the relationship carries important 
implications for political power, party trajectories and democratic 
institutions.  
In the light of this discussion, we show our hypotheses and methodology below. 
 
3. Hypothesis development and methodology  
Numerous studies argue that capital formations and the identity of capitalists 
changed fundamentally as the intensity of Islamist political discourse grew since 
the 1990s.40 Turkey’s Islamist political movements have long been in ideological 
confrontation with modern secularism and westernisation that rested on a 
Eurocentric worldview.41  Recognising the economic backwardness as a major 
problem, political Islam promised a new economic rejuvenation and salvation 
against decadent capitalism and imperialism through a moral course of state-led 
developmentalism. Several Islamic parties before the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) faced closures or judicial bans due to their anti-establishment 
religious bias by the secular state institutions, the military and the judiciary.  
Nevertheless, Turkish politics accommodated and frequently promoted Islam 
against the spread of communism during the cold war. The rise of political Islam 
to power, however, is closely linked to the recent history of market liberalisation, 
its debilitating effects on the traditional centre right politics, and a general societal 
discontent with development prospect offered by the main stream political parties.  
 
The September 1980 military coup created initial conditions for market de-
regulation and subsequent suppression of opposition interests and left wing 
politics. A former World Bank employee and an ideologue of the New Right, 
Turgut Özal, played a crucial role in introducing the Washington Consensus 
principals, initially as an economic policy advisor to the post 1980 coup and later 
as Prime Minister and the leader of the Motherland Party (Turkish acronym 
ANAP). A member of the Nakshibendi order, one of the most influential Islamic 
brotherhoods, Özal was also a parliamentary candidate from the first Islamist 
party in 1970. When the generals banned former political leaders and closed down 
incumbent parties in 1980, Özal formed ANAP, which contained centre right, 
ultra-nationalists, Islamists and democrats at once. ANAP came to power in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Author; Atasoy 2009; Tuğal 2009; Gumuscu 2010.  
41	  Gülalp, 1999; Tuğal 2009.	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1983 elections with a full-fledged programme of de-regulation and liberalisation 
of the economy backed by a military made authoritarian constitution. Having 
shaped a decade long switch to liberalisation and re-Islamisation, Özal died 
unexpectedly while serving as President in 1993.   
 
The rise of Islamic politics to centre stage began when Erdoğan was elected as 
mayor of Istanbul in 1994 for a four-year term. Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül42, and 
others from the Refah Party formed the AKP in 2001 and came to power in 2002. 
The new party pledged to adhere to multi-party democracy and economic 
liberalisation. Its cadres, however, originated from earlier right-wing Islamic 
political movements, most notably Milli Görüş.43 With a pro-business liberal 
outlook, the AKP challenged the status quo in domestic politics, gained 
international sympathy, and maintained the economic growth necessary to secure 
electoral support.  
 
The AKP benefitted greatly from the growing number of Islamic charities and 
their affiliated business groups in its election campaigns. Yavuz (2004) argued 
that the spread of Islamic brotherhoods was associated with the rise of civil 
society against the authoritarian state and a new force for democratisation. 
Contrary to this claim, the most influential such groups were linked to official 
policies to promote Islam in the state and society, especially in the aftermath of 
the 1980 military coup.44 Tuğal (2009) referred to this transformation as the de-
radicalisation of the Islamist political movement and its embrace of neo-liberalism 
as a “passive revolution”.  
 
Neo-liberalism and democratisation rhetoric offered two critical tools for the AKP 
in its aspiration towards hegemonic regime change.45 This took place through the 
expansion of party control over the judiciary, the police force, the military and in 
education. It strengthened its control over privatisations, urban development 
projects and capital flows in local and regional markets. The AKP also weakened 
societal resistance and interest group pressures through social welfare reforms in 
public health, mass housing provisions and education policies. Subsequently, 
while the AKP grasped control of central institutions and monopolised state 
power, it developed a decentralised populist reach to the electorate through two 
channels: state and municipal provisions and Islamic charities and foundations.46 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Abdullah Gül became President in 2007.	  
43 Atacan 2005. 
44 Tuğal 2012. 
45 Polat, 2012 46	  Bartu and Kolluoglu 2008; Karaman, 2013. 
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Islamic fraternity organisations and charities expanded their activities into 
business ventures taking advantage of liberalisation. 47  Alternative capital 
formations led to Islamic finance discourses in provincial economies 48  and 
religious fraternity groups promoted their own business ethics to counter-balance 
social inequalities.49 This implies that during its rule the party and its strong leader 
developed their influence in businesses to build market power parallel to their 
political might. Thus, we study political connections to the ruling party and their 
performance effects through H1 and H2. 
 
H1: Connected firms enjoyed abnormal growth rates compared to other listed 
firms. 
 
H2: Connected firms are less likely to drop rank in the list. 
 
 
The establishment of the Islamist business association, MÜSİAD,50 in 1990 was 
the first step in the growth of pro-Islamic business solidarity groups that supported 
Islamist political parties.  The antagonism between MÜSİAD and its rival, 
TÜSİAD51 (established in 1971), gave way to a growing political split in the form 
of old secular vs. new religious bourgeoisie.52 Intra-business struggles also took 
place among different factions of the local business groups, which led to 
organisational splits between pro-AKP associations and their rivals. 53  While 
MÜSİAD emerged as a powerful pro-AKP business group with representative 
offices in 48 countries, several business federations united to form TUSKON54 in 
2005.  TUSKON’s base is dispersed among SMEs and Anatolian cities with strong 
links to the Gȕlen Movement (commonly known as Hizmet, or “service”), an 
influential Islamic fraternity organisation.55  Thus, the two new Islamic employers’ 
organisations, MÜSİAD and TUSKON, enjoyed extensive political and business 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Hoşgör 2011; Öniş 1997. 
48 Author. 
49 Uygur 2009. 
50  MÜSİAD: Mȕstakil Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği (Independent Industrialists and 
Businessmen’s Association). 
51 TÜSİAD: Tȕrkiye Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği (Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s 
Association). 
52 Çokgezen 2000. 
53 Bayırbağ 2011. 
54  TUSKON: Türkiye İşadamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu (Turkish Confederation of 
Businessmen and Industrialists). 
55 Atasoy 2009; Hoşgör 2011.  The movement operates schools in over one hundred countries and 
is associated with many businesses united under TUSKON, television channels and Zaman, one of 
Turkey’s largest-circulation newspapers. 
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ties with the AKP government,56 and the former is reportedly closer to Erdoğan 
and his circle. These two associations competed for influence from the mid 2000s. 
In December 2013, corruption allegations, involving leading cabinet ministers, 
Erdoğan and his family prompted the AKP to denounce the Gȕlen Movement as a 
parallel state and initiated a smear campaign against Gȕlen-affiliated schools and 
business activities. 57  Our analysis considers the period before the growing 
confrontation between these former allies.58 We assess the performance variation 
according to their distinct political capital and access to AKP through H3.  
Furthermore, we investigate whether power building by the AKP affected the 
status of old business groups in Turkish industry. Karadağ (2010) pointed out that 
the AKP diminished or destroyed some of the older business holdings while 
protecting its affiliated firms.  [The authors’ paper] on energy utility privatisations 
between 2003 and 2013 showed that highly personalised and opaque allocation of 
assets increased the power of new business groups that enjoyed close ties with 
Erdoğan and key party officials. Thus, we test if the ranking of the business groups 
that originated from the early Republican Era were challenged by AKP linked 
firms through H4. 
 
H3: Type of connection through either Islamic employer’s organisation 
(MÜSİAD and TUSKON) is differentially effective on firm performance. 
 
H4: Connected firms weakened the position of old business groups in the industry 
rankings. 
 
3.1. Data 
The Istanbul Chamber of Industry (ISO) data, collected annually since 1993, is the 
most comprehensive and reliable business record in the country.  There are three 
other leading national lists, Forbes 500, Capital 500 and Fortune 500. However, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 An example: the former head of MÜSİAD, Mr. Ömer Bolat, later became a member of the 
governing board of the AKP.    
57 The Gȕlen Movement has long been in a partnership with Erdoğan’s government in their power 
struggle against the military and secular establishment, in particular the judiciary. However, the 
Movement is accused of infiltrating into police, judiciary and other state organs and pursuing an 
agenda of their own under orders from their spiritual leader, Fetullah Gȕlen, who leads a reclusive 
life in Pennsylvania.  A vicious power struggle has led to an open battle between Erdoğan and 
Gȕlen. A string of high level corruption allegations that have emerged against AKP’s top officials 
and their relatives since 17 December 2013 is claimed to be orchestrated by the Movement’s 
members (see reporting at Financial Times, by Daniel Dombey, March 18, 2014). 
58 See the insightful coverage at “Human Rights Practice in Turkey” 
http://humanrightspracticeinturkey.com/2014/02/13/23/(accessed on 1 May 2014). 
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these have numerous methodological constraints and biases since their Turkish 
editions are compiled by magazines owned by leading business groups (Çalık 
Holding, Doğan Holding and the Mutlu Journal Group, respectively). In addition 
to its perceived neutrality, the chamber’s annual business survey has a very high 
penetration across Turkish regions through its sister organisations.  As the biggest 
and most developed organisation of its kind, it benefits from close links to 
chambers of industry in each town. This facilitates data collection through a 
nation-wide survey administered by local chambers.  
 
New firms as well as old ones are surveyed annually. Although inclusion in the 
ISO database is voluntary, its survey has high participation due to its well-
established professional credibility and national prominence. For featured firms it 
is highly prestigious to be included in the Istanbul Chamber of Industry business 
ranking.  For local chambers it brings visibility and recognition to their towns and 
sends positive signals to potential investors and helps to build lobbying activates 
for local economic development. Every year the announcement of ISO’s annual 
ranking creates excitement in business circles and the press nationwide. Towns far 
from Istanbul, such as Kahraman Maraş and Gaziantep, take pride in the number 
of firms they have in the ISO’s top ranking. While it is expected that Turkey’s 
largest business groups get top positions, the list frequently stimulates wider 
commentary on the ranked firms from less known towns. Thus, both local 
chambers and industrialists have incentives to get involved in the annual business 
surveys. The ISO data initially ranked the top 500 firms in the country but later 
expanded its coverage to include the top 1,000 in 1997.59  
There are a number of restrictions in identifying PCF in the Turkish context.  
Firstly, political ties in business are poorly recorded in the mainstream media.60 
Only major scandals get attention.  Secondly, there is no reliable database of 
political campaign contributions, business stakes of politicians, or any disclosure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 The stock-market data, based on 370 listed firms (including foreign-owned ones), appear to be 
inferior to Istanbul Chamber of Industry’s coverage.    
60 The AK Party in government has systematically purged the independent press and journalists 
who reported about poor management and corruption. See the EFJ website for the details: 
http://europe.ifj.org/en/articles/turkish-authorities-attack-tgs-the-largest-ifj-and-efj-affiliate-in-the-
country (accessed on 14 June 2012). Journalists such as Nedim Şener, Ahmet Şık and Soner 
Yalçın, were arrested on conspiracy charges. Mr Şener wrote books to illustrate that the Gȕlen 
Movement has infiltrated the police force and the judiciary (The Economist, March 17th 2012). 
http://www.economist.com/node/21550334. (Accessed on 17 October 2012). Soner Yalçın 
supported this claim in his recent book written from his prison cell. See Soner Yalçın (2012) 
Samizdat (Doğan Yayıncılık, Istanbul). See also the influential “Human Rights Practice in Turkey” 
blog:http://humanrightspracticeinturkey.wordpress.com/2013/11/08/how-moral-is-the-
conservative-rule-in-turkey-media-assassinations/ (accessed on 15 November 2013). 
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requirements by firms that have politicians as shareholders or on their boards. As 
the majority of the ISO 1,000 are not traded on the stock-market, they are also not 
subject to disclosure rules. Thus, our identification of political connections rests 
on extensive media and secondary data analysis. While national media outlets 
have been restrained in reporting politically sensitive news, the local press 
continues to provide a broad range of information on business activities and 
political ties.  This widespread and vibrant press, tied to dynamic local realities, is 
a good source for understanding political ties. 
MÜSİAD and TUSKON have membership data bases but do not allow us to see 
the data about year of joining. However, there is a clear identification: both have 
been part of the Islamic political movement from their start and closely in tune 
with the AKP.61 Thus, our analysis regards both associations as part of politically 
connected networks.  We tested our claim by examining if firms were switching 
from TÜSİAD to MÜSİAD, and this movement has been found to be 
insignificant. Double memberships also appear to be insignificant. Moreover, 
TÜSİAD has not been losing membership.62   
 
3.2 Definitions, identification of connections and analysis 
We group politically connected firms in two categories, separating those with 
direct personal connections (PCF-1) from those connected through networks 
(PCF-2). 
 
1) Firms with direct personal connections (PCF-1): By using Faccio’s (2006, p. 
370) definition of “politically connected firm” we classified PCF-1 if one of the 
company’s shareholders or top managers is: i) a member of parliament from the 
ruling AKP; ii) a minister or the head of state; iii) closely related to the top AKP 
officials. We first identified the firm’s key owners, shareholders and board 
members. Then, we investigated their associations in the Turkey search engine of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61  PM Erdoğan and AKP ministers have long established political and personal ties with 
MÜSİAD and TUSKON.  
http://www.dunya.com/28-subatin-en-onemli-izi-ortadan-kalkti-150037h.htm; 
http://www.dunya.com/tuskon,-hukumetin-yaninda-82273h.htm 
http://www.dunya.com/tuskon,-afrikali-isadamlariyla-bulustu-104711h.htm 
http://www.dunya.com/son-10-yildir-dindarlar-degil,-devler-buyudu-151791h.htm 
Both organisations have considerable influence on policy formation: 
http://www.dunya.com/musiad-ve-kosgeb-girisimci-yetistirecek-106936h.htm (all accessed on 2 
October 2012). 
62 TÜSİAD gained 79 new members in 2012, one of the highest annual increases in new 
memberships.http://gundem.bugun.com.tr/tusiad-da-yeniden-boyner-donemi-181843-haberi.aspx 
The tension between MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD continues. http://www.dunya.com/musiad-alatona-
kapimiz-acik-121921h.htm (all accessed on 1 October 2012). 
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“Google” and the USA site of “Yahoo” (in the absence of a Turkish equivalent 
site). However, all investigations were carried out using Turkish key words. Our 
examinations took place before the AKP government first shut down Twitter and 
YouTube and later introduced draconian rules to monitor social media and 
internet to block the spread of protests and corruption allegations.  After 
identifying the key individuals (usually 2 or 3 people), their names were searched 
along with the Prime Minister, cabinet ministers, MPs and the mayor of the town 
where the firm is located or originates from. Since it would have been laborious to 
use the names of all MPs and cabinet ministers we instead inserted the title used 
before the name, “Bakan” (the Turkish term used for a cabinet minister) and 
“Milletvekili” (the term for a member of parliament).  For example, for a firm 
with two leading owners the investigation proceeds typically like this: firm’s 
name, the name of owner 1, and the name of owner 2 are matched with the words 
of “Prime Minister Erdoğan”, “Cabinet Minister”, “Member of Parliament”, and 
“the name of the local mayor".  Thus, the first three names are investigated one by 
one with the four possible political connections in 12 combinations. For example: 
“Firm’s name” + “Prime Minister Erdoğan”; “Name of Owner1” + “Prime 
Minister Erdoğan”; “Name of Owner2” + “Prime Minister Erdoğan”. 
 
We provide three illustrative cases: i) Kiler Holding is linked to Vahit Kiler, a 
member of parliament from the ruling AKP63; ii) AB Food is linked to Kemal 
Unakıtan, the former Finance Minister and leading AKP politician64; iii) Çalık 
Holding is closely related to Erdoğan as the CEO of the company is his son-in 
law.65 Other examples illustrate less known cases. One diary products company in 
a large southern town of Turkey is linked to several AKP members of parliament. 
One of the major owners is the former chairman of the town’s football 
association, a member of the municipal council from AKP, and an AKP mayoral 
candidate. A hazelnut production and trade firm in a town on the Black Sea coast 
is linked to several members of parliament from the AKP. They and the town’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  	  Sources: http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vahit_Kiler; 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/milletvekillerimiz_sd.bilgi?p_donem=24&p_sicil=6266; 
http://www.kiler.com.tr/files/kiler_a.%C5%9F_faaliyet_%20raporu_2011_3.%C3%87eyrek.pdf 
(accessed on 1 May 2014) 
64  Sources: 
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/diger/112332/Unakitanlar_tesvik_sistemini_sevdi.html;  
http://haber.gazetevatan.com/rabbim-sat-dedi/557485/2/ekonomi; 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/sefer_levent/ogul_unakitana_nazar_mi_degdi-1069417 
(accessed on 1 May 2014) 
65	  Sources: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/21/calikholding-sale-
idUSL5E8DH3KG20120221; http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-13/erdogan-s-new-
elite.html; http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/turkey/8939732.asp?gid=231&sz=88743	  
(accessed on 1 May 2014)	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AKP mayor attended the owner’s daughter’s wedding. He is a member of 
TUSKON, active in its trade activities and gave a speech at the European Summit 
of TUSKON. The latter indicates the overlap of two channels of access. 
 
Identifying the first two types of links with a member of parliament from the 
ruling AKP, a minister or Prime Minister Erdoğan has been possible through our 
search methods and additional sieving through media sources. In the third 
category, identifying firms closely related to top AKP officials has been relatively 
easy for well-known firms through extensive internet and media analysis. 
However, the above two anonymised cases show intricacies of relations. For less 
known firms we studied a range of connection indicators to see if these were 
strong enough to secure political favouritism beyond casual ties. For example, we 
investigated if this connection leads to being a witness “şahit” at a family event of 
owners and/or their children, such as weddings and circumcision ceremonies. 
These roles signify non-casual friendship ties in the Turkish social context, 
especially because they emerge out of and bring further social obligations and 
reciprocity. We recognise that these are culture specific signifiers and may vary 
from one country to another. Nevertheless, they can be good indicators when for 
example club memberships are not significant and many relations are not reported 
or disclosed66.   
 
2) Firms connected through networks (PCF-2): Faccio et al. (2006) provide useful 
insights to identify indirect connections. High-level political experience in 
domestic and international operations requires sophistication and access.  This is 
costly to achieve for firms with limited resources as shown by Keillor and Hunt 
(2004). Since they have developed considerable political acumen and links to the 
ruling party, MÜSİAD and TUSKON offer scale advantages and cost effective 
strategies. We examine if the connectedness served by the two pro-AKP business 
groups facilitate performance.67 Thus, we use membership of these organisations 
as a proxy for PCF-2. This measure helps us to assess the effect of Islamic 
employers’ lobby power and access to political capital. 
 
To identify MÜSİAD and TUSKON links we searched through the commercial 
portals of “TUSKONtrade” and “e-MÜSİAD”. These web engines helped to 
verify membership of the identified firms. For firms that did not appear on these 
sites we carried out additional search through “Google” and “Yahoo” by entering 
the key owner’s name plus MÜSİAD and TUSKON. For example, for a firm with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 For example, Acemoglu et al. (2010) used personal diaries for office meetings to identify 
relations.  It is impossible to secure access to the diaries of Prime Minister Erdoğan, cabinet 
ministers and AKP members of parliament.  
67 See, http://www.musiad.org.tr/ and http://www.tuskon.org/. 
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two leading owners we investigated: “firm name” + “owner1” + “owner 2” + 
“MÜSİAD” + “TUSKON”. We checked their accuracy through other internet 
sources such as websites of associations’ local offices and the company sites, as 
well as national and local newspapers.  For firms that did not appear in these web 
engines, we carried out additional investigations.  We searched the links between 
“the name of the firm”, “owner1” and “owner 2” and “ the name of local director” 
and “the name of national representative” of MÜSIAD and TUSKON in 18 
combinations to test if there is any credible relationship such as benefitting from 
commercial networks, trade fairs, incentive schemes and export promotion 
organisations. For example, a typical search was: “firm’s name” + “MÜSİAD”; 
“firm’s name” + “TUSKON”; “firm’s name” + “the name of MÜSİAD local 
director”; “firm’s name” + “MÜSİAD national representative”; “firm’s name” + 
“TUSKON local director”; “firm’s name” + “TUSKON national representative”. 
 
We systematically reviewed a range of news sources to identify connections. As 
many connected firms and AKP’s business relations spread to various Anatolian 
towns, these localities have access to business news through usually detailed but 
straightforward event reporting.68  
 
The ISO data set provides information on: net sales on production, total sales, 
gross value added, owner’s equity, assets, profit/loss, export, number of 
employees, and the sector. However, the two series are not fully compatible 
because they are reported separately and transitions between them are not 
recorded.  We created a code for each firm to follow transitions among the lists. 
The codes given are unique and consist of the characteristic letters of the firm 
names. We then constituted a top 1,000 industrial enterprise list with an annual 
time series and rank changes of the fastest growing firms between 2003 and 2011. 
A ranking based analysis explains better the overall performance of politically 
connected firms and the change they bring to the industrial structure.  For 
example, a percentage gain or loss in assets, with the firm’s 2003 assets as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Scholars have used unconventional methods in identifying political connections. For example, 
Faccio et al. (2006) identified indirect connections of “friendship” through an analysis of reporting 
in The Economist, Forbes and Fortune magazines. Acemoglu et al. (2010) identified network 
relations through personal diaries, club memberships and news reporting among others. 
 
We reviewed and double checked a broad range of national and local media as well as specialist 
publications.  The national newspapers such as Milliyet, Hűrriyet and Radikal provide some 
relevant background. The financial newspaper Dűnya has also been useful. The list below include 
the local newspaper publications we most frequently visited: http://www.konyahaber.com.tr, 
http://www.kayserigundem.com/, http://www.duzcepostasi.com, http://www.gaziantep27.net, 
http://www.haberantalya.com, http://www.antakyagazetesi.com/, http://www.denizlihaber.com/, 
http://www.orduolay.com/, http://www.gazete55.net/ , http://www.yeniadana.net. 
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baseline, would have been useful to show the trajectory of a particular firm but we 
are primarily investigating PCF as a pack rather than the efficiency of a single 
firm. However, in order to check the robustness of our method we also carried out 
analyses based on the performance of firms (with absolute values of assets) and 
found considerable overlap with our list of PCF (almost 50 per cent). Absolute 
values have shown a pattern of steady increase during the 2003 to 2011 period for 
the majority of firms and this also makes relative performance indicators less 
suitable.  
 
In ranking the fastest growing firms the study used “net sales on production” and 
“assets” as performance measures.  Utilising net sales on production is a difficult 
measure to use because of its sensitivity to changes in the market and inadequacy 
in reflecting scale effects of the firms. However, when combined with a measure 
of assets, they help to minimise sectoral differences, annual fluctuations and 
exogenous shocks. Moreover, profit rate or exports do not necessarily reflect the 
economic performance of firms in a comparative manner. In relation to the key 
arguments of our study, a proxy of economic performance had primarily to be 
convenient to analyse the effects of business networks. Thus, the net sales on 
production and assets are two best fitted proxies for the purpose of the study.  
 
Utilising firm rank allowed us to measure the relative performance of the firms. 
About half of the firms in the latest top 1,000 have been in the list since 2003. 
Therefore, new entrants and others were analysed separately. The analysis 
identified the top 50 fastest growing (all years between 2003 and 2011), 50 fastest 
descending and 25 fastest growing new entrants (since 2003) to provide a sound 
analysis of the dynamic structure of the business rankings.  Each set was 
examined in terms of the firms’ net sales on production and assets for 125 firms 
yielding 250 observations.  
 
 
4.  Findings on political connections and firm performance 
The Istanbul Chamber of Industry’s top 1,000 firms constitute 4 per cent of total 
employment, 11 per cent of GDP and 40 per cent of exports in the Turkish 
economy69. Our analysis shows that these ratios did not change significantly since 
2003, aside from an observed dip in 2009 due to the global financial crisis (see 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 The ISIC Rev. 2 classification of firms are in the following categories: 210-311-312-313-314-
321-322-323-324-331-332-341-342-351-352-353-354-355-356-361-362-369-371-372-381-382-
383-384-385-390-400 
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Table 1). The overall analysis of 2011 data provides the following averages per 
firm: net sales on production ($232 million); value added ($90 million); export 
earnings ($88 thousand); employees (834 persons). Seventy two per cent of the 
firms employed more than 250 persons (92% more than 100). This indicates that 
28 per cent of ISO firms are SMEs.  In the ranking, there are 18 state-owned 
companies (with the median ranking of 212; 8 of them in the top 100) and 144 
firms with more than 50 per cent foreign ownership (with a ranking median of 
349; 18 of these are in the top 100).  About one third of the firms are located in 
Istanbul. Five out of the top 10 companies in this ranking are part of the Koç 
Holding, one of Turkey’s oldest business groups. The other high ranked firms also 
belong to old business groups, each over 50 years old, thus already well-
established when the AKP came to power. These include Sabancı, Eczacıbaşı, 
Akkök, OYAK and Yaşar Holding groups. However, 408 new industrial 
enterprises entered and stayed in the ISO top company ranking since 2003.  This 
shows significant upward mobility in Turkish industry during the past decade.   
 
 
 
Table 1 
 
According to the measure of net sales on production, 26 of the 50 fastest growing 
firms are politically connected either through direct links or institutional networks 
(PCF-1 and PCF-2). When measured according to assets, the number of connected 
firms increases to 28 firms. These connected firms demonstrate that they achieve 
higher operating profit despite having larger employment and lower asset turnover. 
The overlap between the two measures is 33 firms; 21 of them are PCF. These 
findings support our first hypothesis: Connected firms enjoyed abnormal growth 
rates compared to other listed firms. The opposite pattern is observed in the 
analysis of the fastest dropping 50 firms in the ranking: there are only 7 politically 
connected firms according to net sales on production and 12 according to assets. 
The overlap between the two measures is 31 firms and only 4 of them are PCF. 
This evidence supports our second hypothesis: Connected firms are less likely to 
drop rank in the list (see Table 2). 
 
The composition of the fastest growing PCF-1 and PCF-2 are shown in Figures 1 
and 2.  This distribution of connected firms shows the predominance of personal 
ties (15 firms) according to measures of both sales and assets.  There is some 
overlap between PCF-1 and PCF-2: 4 firms (according to sales) and 5 firms 
(according to assets).  Institutional network channels show differentiation as 
TUSKON emerges as more effective in retaining and cultivating business 
performance. We observed 10 (in sales) and 13 (in assets) connected firms with it. 
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TUSKON has also the lowest number of rank drops. These results show that 
channels of access have varied consequences in business performance. TUSKON 
has been a more effective business lobby group. Thus, findings support our third 
hypothesis: Type of connection through either Islamic employer’s organisations 
(MÜSİAD and TUSKON) is differentially effective on firm performance. This 
finding has important ramifications since Erdoğan initiated an extensive purge of 
all Gülen linked groups since 17 December 2013. Reports suggest that TUSKON 
affiliated firms increasingly face tax evasion investigations and are de-listed from 
government procurement schemes. 70  For example, the majority state owned 
company, Turkish Airlines, removed Zaman, a Gülen affiliated newspaper, from 
its in-flight service. This previously favoured daily was also dropped from 
government linked advertisements and promotions. Bank Asya faced liquidity 
problems when several large companies, among them Turkish Airlines, withdrew 
their deposits (Bilgic, 2014). In response to growing purges, TUSKON shut down 
its business web portal (tuskontrade.com.tr), presumably to block information on 
its members and to remove sensitive data. 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Figure 1 
 
Figure 2 
 
Firms with political connections have shown abnormal performance on average 
over non-connected firms in increase in sales, value added and profit rate. Despite 
having lower labour production rates, both PCF-1 and PCF-2 operate with higher 
profit rates on average. According to net sales, the fastest 50 firms’ place vary 
between the 97th and 652nd positions while the fastest 50 according to assets have 
a spread between the 114th and 882nd positions. Almost half of these observed 
cases are in a higher ranking position than their non-connected peers on average.   
 
In order to test the robustness of the evidence that supports H1 and H3, we also 
examined the firms that joined the list and stayed after the AKP came into power. 
Another striking feature to emerge from the analysis is the rapid rise of AKP-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 See further reporting on business purges: 
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/14637/Cemaat_sirketlerine_inceleme.html 
http://www.internethaber.com/cemaatin-sirketlerine-sok-baskin-653802h.htm 
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linked firms that entered the list since 2003.  We studied 25 firms in this category 
and they moved at least 414 ranks in net sales and 319 in assets since their entry. 
We identified 16 such firms as politically connected according to net sales and 14 
according to assets (see Figure 3).  The dominance of politically supported firms 
among the fastest new entrants is a significant indicator of the increasing 
influence of AKP in business. Most of the fastest new entrants are members of 
TUSKON. This distribution might also be another signifier of an intra-factional 
differentiation among AKP’s client business groups (see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3 
  
Despite the rapid rise of AKP linked business groups and favouritism in the 
market, only one of these fastest growing 50 firms managed to get in the top 100. 
Thus, our findings do not fully support the fourth hypothesis: Connected firms did 
not weaken the position of old business groups in the industry rankings. With 
further aspirations, MÜSİAD argued that all businesses “made gains” under the 
liberal economic order but it benefitted old business groups much more than 
“pious ones”.71  Turkey’s first generation family holdings grew under import 
substitution policies until the 1980s and used their home advantages skilfully to 
benefit from the Customs Union with the EU that was agreed in 1995. They 
pursued diverse export markets and internationalisation strategies. Their 
domination of the top ISO ranking rests on a process of industrial capacity 
building and capital accumulation over more than half a century. A closer 
examination of the fastest growing three firms according to net sales on 
production shows that they all have personal connections (PCF-1) and had a 
phenomenal rise: climbing 707, 683 and 647 ranks respectively in the list.  The 
top two of them made major gains through privatisations. According to assets, the 
first and third fastest growing firms again have direct connections (PCF-1) and are 
in the metal industry where asset size is important.  These firms rose 599, 573 and 
566 ranks respectively. This growth of AKP connected firms and affiliated 
business networks suggests a possible break up in old business holdings in 
coming years, if the party maintains its majority rule.  Moreover, state-owned 
firms in the list are subject to government intervention in favour of AKP linked 
firms or against their opponents, as seen in the cases of withdrawn favours for 
Zaman newspaper and Bank Asya. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71Outgoing chairman Mr Vardan emphasised that MÜSİAD’s 3,500 members account for 15 per 
cent of Turkey’s exports, 105 billion USD gross domestic product and that they account for 10 per 
cent of the top 1,000 firms, half of them are in the first 500. http://www.dunya.com/son-10-yildir-
dindarlar-degil,-devler-buyudu-151791h.htm (accessed on 2 October 2012). 
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We have shown that cross-country studies on PCFs are unable to demonstrate the 
extent to which political ties take shape in emerging economies as they fail to 
apply their definitions consistently across countries. Understanding the direction 
of change in business-politics relations requires historical studies. Industry level 
analyses are also better placed to provide the spread and effects of connections. 
Our findings show that firms with political connections have had abnormal 
performance on average over non-connected firms in increase in sales, value 
added and profit rate under AKP rule. Despite having lower labour 
production rates, both PCF-1 and PCF-2 operate with higher profit rates on 
average (this evidence supports H1). They are also less likely to drop in the 
ranking (this evidence supports H2). The dominance of politically connected 
firms among the fastest new entrants (since 2003) is another significant indicator 
of the increasing influence of AKP in business. The type of connectedness 
through personal ties and institutional networks shows performance variations 
among firms. The core group of firms (PCF-1) are connected to the Prime 
Minister and his close allies in the party. The second group (PCF-2) are linked to 
institutions of pro-government business support networks. The former appears to 
be the dominant case for the fastest growing large firms. Its influence over the 
economy has also been increasing, especially through new public contracts and 
privatisations.72 The latter allows small and medium-sized businesses to have 
access to resources. TUSKON emerges as more effective than MÜSİAD in 
retaining and cultivating business performance (this evidence supports H3).   
 
The phenomenal performance of politically connected firms did not lead to a 
substantial weakening of old business groups.  This finding does not fully support 
H4. Nevertheless, the overall composition of the largest industrial firms, the 
narrowing gap between the old generation capitalists and the AKP linked firms 
and the dynamic entry structure to the top 1,000 company ranking show that 
Turkey has more room for business growth opportunities than is seen in other 
countries. This contrasts with Russia where market concentration is extremely 
high and business-politics relations are much more tightly structured. 73  In 
emerging markets, a similar but less dramatic outcome implies that old business 
groups maintain their domination without much challenge from the rank and file 
of growing SMEs.74 This point needs further empirical research as industry 
structures and scales vary greatly. Turkish business groups are also smaller than 
their emerging market counterparts, indicating relatively slow capital 
accumulation, poor energy resources and late internationalisation. Only the Koç 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  See Authors’ research on energy privatisations.	  Öniş, 2011. 
73 Guriev and Rachinsky 2005. 
74 Khanna and Palepu 1999; Ramamurti 2000; Salas-Poras 2005; Khanna and Yafeh 2007. 
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Group was listed in the 2011 Fortune 500, as opposed to 7 firms from Brazil, 14 
from South Korea, 8 from India, and 3 from Mexico.75 
 
The continuing domination of older generation family holdings along with 
multinational and state-owned firms in key industries is an outcome of a half a 
century of uninterrupted industrial growth. The largest firms, which once enjoyed 
government support, are now not in need of close political connections to 
maintain their business prowess. They have more resources to manage different 
political stakeholders at home and abroad.76 However, following the popular Gezi 
protests against the AKP government, Turkey’s largest family holding, Koç, came 
under fire because of the refuge given to wounded demonstrators by its hotel in 
Istanbul. In the following weeks, tax auditors raided several Koç companies and 
rumours about Erdoğan’s intent to demolish the economic power of the group 
emerged in the media.77 Similarly, Erdoğan’s former ally, the Gülen Movement, 
and its affiliated businesses are threatened by AKP’s recent judicial and 
bureaucratic “cleansing” measures to cover up corruption allegations against 
leading members of the party, including Erdoğan and his family.  In the coming 
years AKP connections may significantly alter the ranking if the party maintains 
its majority control in parliament and fends off growing societal discontent and 
polarisation. 
 
Choi and Thum (2009: 608) suggested that, “a regime may face a critical-mass 
problem in setting up a system of politically-connected firms.” The Islamic 
political movement reached this critical mass since it first expanded its business 
base at the local government level throughout the 1990s. As the governing party, 
AKP has dominated the process of economic liberalisation with increasing FDI, 
privatisation and major infrastructure projects for more than a decade. This 
resulted in the growth of a parallel and antagonistic capitalist power vis-a-vis the 
old business groups and the political establishment through the ideological 
mobilisation of political Islam.   
  
Our findings have significant implications for studying the long-term economic 
and political effects of business ties under deepening single party control. As 
Bucheli and Kim (2012) show, being closely associated with one political 
ideology, leader or an authoritarian regime brings legitimacy problems for foreign 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75  http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2012/full_list/ (accessed on 17 October 
2012) 
76 Keillor and Hult 2004.	  
77  See, Semih Idiz, “The AKP shoots its goose”, Hurriyet Daily 30/July/ 2013.  
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/the-akp-shoots-its-goose-
.aspx?pageID=238&nID=51639&NewsCatID=416 (accessed on  5 August 2013) 
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firms when such systems go through major changes. The same argument applies 
to politically connected domestic firms. Businesses that do not comply with 
demands of political actors get reprisals. Those closely linked to the political class 
face threats of losing their benefits when key agents leave their positions.78 
Worse, under major political changes, formerly favoured firms can fall from grace 
and lose their fortune entirely. Thus, although they may compensate for 
institutional uncertainties, political connections are a liability for firms in the long 
run. Under attack from its former ally, TUSKON affiliated firms’ uncertain future 
is the case in point. Even if these firms manage to shift their political alliances 
periodically, allocating resources through political favouritism limits management 
choices, distorts firm performance and brings long-term economic and societal 
costs.  
 
If organised around capable technocratic cadres and industrial policies, as seen in 
post-war South Korea and Japan, close ties between businesses and the state can 
nurture successful innovations and stable political regimes.79  However, there is 
also a clear danger of political entrenchment through excessive business control 
and government intervention. Many studies have shown how politically connected 
firms are not more efficient or competitive than their non-connected 
counterparts.80 In our analysis, connected firms demonstrate that they achieve 
higher operating profits despite having larger employment and lower asset 
turnover. None of these fastest growing firms are in high technology areas. This 
evidence points out the issues of misallocation of resources through political 
clientelism and corruption.81  
 
Deepening business-politics ties bring hazardous effects on political institutions 
and economic freedoms.82 We showed here that party ideologies and leadership 
styles are important as they determine institutional workings. 83  A close 
association between authoritarian leadership and business diverts resources to an 
uneven distribution of property rights in favour of a few private actors as seen in 
Mubarek’s Egypt.84  Hankla’s (2006) observation on India’s Congress Party is a 
telling example of the danger of political deepening in multi-party parliamentary 
regimes. Although it appeared as if it was part of socialist ideology, Indra 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Johnson and Mitton 2003. 
79 As Hankla 2006 observed in the case of Gandhi in India.	  
80 See for example Khwaja and Mian 2005; Claessens et al. 2008. 
81 This point has become more pertinent since the 17 December 2013 corruption scandals. See also 
Adly, 2009; Abdel-Baki, 2012; Li and Tang 2012.  
82	  Acemoglu and Robinson 2006.	  
83	  See for example Fisman 2001 on Indonesia and Adly 2009 on Egypt. 
84 Adly, 2009. 
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Gandhi’s economic policy decisions essentially aimed to develop new sources of 
patronage to stabilise her electorate linkages. “Having centralized the Congress 
Party under her personal leadership, Gandhi and her associates managed India’s 
patronage networks personally, targeting largess for the maximum political 
benefit. This system, with a few changes, remained largely in place through the 
1970s and 1980s, and, according to many observers, significantly slowed India’s 
potential economic growth”.85 Similarly, Erdoğan’s AKP follows an ideologically 
motivated strategy to nurture a patronage regime in order to secure long-lasting 
electoral success.  A concern is also growing about its true intentions of replacing 
Turkey’s multi-party democracy with a majoritarian single party rule.  
 
Further studies might benefit from detailed firm level analyses as well as large 
samples. They might also illuminate new dimensions of performance and political 
connectedness by examining government privatisation schemes, large 
construction and infrastructure investments and economic rejuvenation projects. 
Current studies mostly deal with large stock listed companies that are subject to a 
degree of corporate governance and these should be expanded further. The spread 
and depth of business-politics ties, their economic value to the firm, impact on 
political institutions and the welfare costs of such ties to society remain under-
researched in business literature. The lack of transparency in government and 
businesses continues to be the biggest methodological hindrance for national and 
international studies, particularly in emerging markets. Researchers need to rely 
on more grounded data sources. Our contribution to this debate demonstrates the 
benefits of further analysis.   
 
Acknowledgements to follow 
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Figure 1.  The composition of PCF in the fastest rank ascends and drops (Net 
Sales) 
 
Increase (N=50) Decrease (N=50) 
  
 
 
Figure 2. The Composition of PCF in the fastest rank ascends and drops 
(Assets) 
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Figure 3. The Composition of PCF in the fastest rank ascend of 25 new 
entrants (Net Sales and Assets) 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Top 1000 in 2011 
Variable N Mean Median S.D. Min Max 
Sales (mil.TLa) 947 390 160 1100 71 27000 
Value added (mil.TL) 671 150 32 930 -480 20000 
Export (th. $) 787 88 29 286 3 4245 
Employee 834 816 450 1325 12 14703 
Asset turnover 799 1.3 1.1 1 0.05 17 
Labour productivity (th.TL) 657 169 78 732 -2167 14000 
Profit rate 671 0.057 0.034 0.13 -1.4 1.3 
Rankd 1000 501 501 289 1 1000 
Source: Istanbul Chamber of Industry, the top 500 and the second top 500 industrial 
enterprises of 2011 based on the authors’ own analysis 
a Average exchange rate was 1.68 TL/$ in 2011. 
b Asset turnover is calculated by dividing net sales to total assets.  
c Labour productivity shows the value added per employee. 
d Rank is based on net sales. 
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